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 RUM, ROMANISM, AND VIRGINIA DEMOCRATS
 The Party Leaders and the Campaign of 1928
 hy James R. Sweeney*
 'The most exciting and most bitterly fought State-wide campaign held in
 Virginia since the days of General William Mahone and the Readjusters."
 In these words the Richmond Times-Dispatch described the just-concluded
 campaign on election day morning, 6 November 1928. Democratic nomi-
 nees had carried Virginia in every presidential election since 1872; how-
 ever, in predominantly agricultural, dry, Protestant Virginia a political
 upheaval was a distinct possibility in 1928. The Democrats' nomination of
 Gov. Alfred E. Smith of New York?wet, Roman Catholic, and affiliated
 with Tammany Hall?produced the most serious crisis for the leadership
 of the Virginia Democratic party since the 1880s. The leaders response
 to this challenge was a belated, albeit vigorous, effort to save Virginia for
 the Democratic presidential nominee. The obstacles, however, proved in-
 surmountable, and Republican Herbert Hoover defeated Al Smith by over
 24,000 votes.1
 Virginia during the 1920s remained essentially an agrarian, conservative
 state despite the modernization of state government and the attraction of
 new industry which characterized the governorship of Harry Flood Byrd.
 State policy on liquor consumption had been the dominant political issue
 in the commonwealth during the previous decade. During those years the
 Anti-Saloon League of Virginia and its superintendent, Rev. James Cannon,
 *Mr. Sweeney is an associate professor in the History Department at Old Dominion University.
 A summer faculty research fellowship from the Old Dominion University Research Foundation
 made possible the completion of this article.
 1 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 6 Nov. 1928; Ralph Eisenberg, Virginia Votes, 1924-1968 (Char-
 lottesville, 1971), p. 64.
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 Jr., a Methodist minister, had formed a political partnership with the
 Democratic organization led by Sen. Thomas S. Martin. The Martin-
 Cannon alliance, although often strained, held firm until Martin's death in
 1919. By 1926 the youthful Harry Byrd had been elected governor and
 had established himself as the most likely successor to Martin as head of
 the Democratic organization. Although there was still a strong commitment
 to prohibition in the state and the Anti-Saloon League retained considerable
 power, Byrd had been able to win the governorship without the leagues
 or Bishop Cannon's support in 1925. In fact Byrd had run in defiance of
 Cannon's wishes, and the mutual antagonism between Byrd and Cannon
 had severed the Anti-Saloon League's ties to the Democratic organization.
 It must be noted, however, that Byrd himself was a dry and enforced the
 prohibition laws stricdy.2
 The Democrats' choice of Al Smith as their presidential nominee in 1928
 deepened the division between Governor Byrd and Bishop Cannon. "De-
 mocracy will be better served," Cannon stated prior to the Democratic
 convention, "by the defeat of the wet Tammany sachem, Alfred E. Smith,
 rather than by his election." Byrd and the other leaders of the Democratic
 organization in Virginia also opposed Smith's nomination. They realized
 that the New York governor's opposition to prohibition, his religion, and
 his background in Tammany Hall would make him less than an appealing
 candidate to many Virginians. The leaders, however, would stand by the
 party nominee whereas Cannon would do his utmost to defeat Smith.8
 Sen. Carter Glass was the first member of the Virginia Democratic
 hierarchy to publish his views on the nomination of Governor Smith. The
 tide of his article in the May 1927 Review of Reviews, "Could Smith Be
 Elected? As a Catholic, Yes! As a Wet,' No!," summarized his thesis. If
 Smith were nominated on "a sound and sane platform," Glass believed
 that the nominee's Catholicism "would not, as it certainly should not, cause
 him to lose Virginia or any other Southern state at the election." If, on the
 other hand, Smith were nominated "as an exponent of the view that the
 Eighteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution should be repealed or
 2 John Stanley Hopewell, "An Outsider Looking In: John Garland Pollard and Machine Politics
 in Twentieth Century Virginia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1976), pp. 124-25; Allen W.
 Moger, Virginia: Bourbonism to Byrd, 1870-1925 (Charlottesville, 1968), pp. 297-319 passim;
 Robert T. Hawkes, Jr., "The Emergence of a Leader: Harry Flood Byrd, Governor of Virginia,
 1926-1930," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, LXXXII (1974), 264; Virginius Dab-
 ney, Vir&nia: The New Dominion (Garden City, 1971), p. 481. Cannon had been elected a
 bishop in 1918.
 3 Virginius Dabney, Dry Messiah: The Life of Bishop Cannon (New York, 1949), p. 177;
 Hawkes, "Emergence of a Leader," VMHB, LXXXII (1974), 278.
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 molested," or that the Volstead Act should be replaced by legislation that
 would effectively nullify the amendment, he would be "badly beaten in
 Virginia and the South and the country."4
 Senator Glass underestimated the potential impact of religious prejudice
 on a Virginia election. In the state election of 1925 John M. Purcell, a
 Roman Catholic, was the choice of the Democratic organization for state
 treasurer. What the Richmond Times-Dispatch described as an "anonymous,
 underground campaign" against Purcell began in the Democratic primary
 and continued into the general election. Campaign literature attacked
 Purcell because he was a Roman Catholic. He won, but only by 25,837
 votes as compared to Byrd's margin of victory of nearly 70,000 for the
 governorship. If John Purcell, a loyal Virginia Democrat with a long
 apprenticeship in party affairs, were vulnerable to attack only on the basis
 of his Catholicism, how much more effectve would similar tactics be when
 used against a Roman Catholic candidate from the cultural milieu of the
 sidewalks of New York.5
 During the spring of 1928, Al Smith's candidacy for the Democratic
 presidential nomination was very much on the minds of the Democratic
 leaders in Virginia. Political writer Earl Lutz of the Times-Dispatch wrote
 that Virginia's leaders hoped that the issue of Smith's nomination would be
 settled before the Roanoke convention. Even if Smith's nomination were
 assured, "the dry and klan forces" would not be content without an effort
 to instruct against a wet candidate. Lutz predicted, "This will smoke out
 the leaders who so far have evaded the issue." Lutz's forecast was wrong.
 The Democratic leaders were working on a strategy to prevent any con-
 troversy at the Roanoke meeting.6
 The state convention at Roanoke's City Auditorium was a lively affair,
 but the party leadership succeeded in getting it over in one day without
 major disruption. Supporters of Al Smith had been making gains at the
 meetings around the state to elect delegates to the Roanoke convention. In
 spite of the conclave being "an Al Smith convention," the party leadership
 retained control. The party stalwarts adroitly got a motion to adjourn past
 the Smith forces and thus insured that an uninstructed delegation would
 go to the Democratic National Convention. Two weeks before the con-
 * Carter Glass, "Could Smith Be Elected? As a Catholic, Yes! As a Wet/ No!," American
 Review of Reviews, LXXV (May 1927), 477.
 5 David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Garden City,
 1965), pp. 232-33; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 Nov., 4 Nov. 1925; Report of the Secretary of
 the Commonwealth, Year Ending June 30, 1926 (Richmond, 1926), pp. 441-42, 534-35.
 6 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 2 May 1928.
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 vention, Sen. Claude Swanson had written Glass that "it is of the utmost
 importance that we act wisely at Roanoke and not offend our dry friends
 or there will be trouble in Virginia for some time to come." The Democrats
 had been able to "act wisely" without unduly offending either the drys or
 the Smith supporters.7
 The platform which the state convention adopted was a blistering attack
 on the Republican administrations of the 1920s for their corruption and
 their failure to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. Senator Glass, the
 author of the platform, was elected a delegate to the national convention
 along with the other party leaders, Governor Byrd, Democratic State Chair-
 man Murray Hooker, and Sen. Claude Swanson. Glass had not wanted to go
 to Houston but allowed himself to be persuaded by his wife and Senator
 Swanson. Swanson had written, "I think you and I had better arrange to go
 to Houston. If Smith is nominated it is of the utmost importance that the
 platform be not injurious and accentuate the fact of his nomination. Besides,
 the people of Virginia would not like us to shirk responsibility in this
 crisis.
 Governor Byrd, Senator Swanson, and other Democratic leaders were
 eager to preserve harmony among the Virginia delegation to the national
 convention. They decided that eighteen of Virginia's twenty-four votes
 would be cast on the first ballot for Rep. Cordell Hull of Tennessee. No
 one believed that Hull had the slightest chance of being nominated, but
 he was an alternative to voting for Smith, who would receive the remaining
 six votes. If the Smith faction headed by Richard Crane of Westover had
 forced the issue, they might have been able to muster ten votes on the first
 ballot. The Smith supporters, however, respected the wishes of the leaders
 upon whom would fall the responsibility of conducting the statewide cam-
 paign for Smith. The Richmond Times-Dispatch commented that the vote
 for Hull indicated that the leaders were thinking of the party's future in
 Virginia. Smith had to be sacrificed at the convention "for the good of
 [Virginia] Democracy." The leaders could then return home, saying they
 had tried to prevent Smith's nomination and "then, bowing to the inevitable
 as all good Democrats do, they could work for Al." Governor Smith was
 nominated overwhelmingly on the first ballot at Houston. Virginia had
 7 Virginian-Pilot and Norfolk Landmark, 22 June 1928; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 23 June
 1928; Claude A. Swanson to Carter Glass, 7 June 1928, Carter Glass Papers, University of Vir-
 ginia Library, Charlottesville (hereafter cited as ViU).
 8 Virginian-Pilot and Norfolk Landmark, 22 June 1928; Claude A. Swanson to Carter Glass,
 7 June 1928; Glass to Swanson, 8 June 1928, Glass Papers. Byrd, Glass, Hooker, and Swanson
 were often referred to in the press as the "Big Four" of the Virginia Democratic party.
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 litde to do with that result, but one Virginia delegate did play a major
 role in drafting the party platform.9
 Carter Glass was the author of the prohibition plank in the Democratic
 national platform. The plank, destined to be the most important in the
 presidential campaign, was quite similar to the one Glass had written for the
 Virginia Democratic platform adopted at Roanoke. Although he was an
 ardent dry, Glass tried to mediate between the prohibition zealots and the
 wets. His aim was "to minimize the importance of prohibition as a presi-
 dential issue by confining the party declaration to a simple law enforcement
 proposition." The pledge to support the Constitution and the laws would
 in no way prevent any officer, even the president of the United States,
 from recommending modification or even repeal of prohibition. After an "all
 night and all day struggle," Glass was successful in persuading the Resolu-
 tions Committee to adopt his position. When he explained his plank to the
 convention, he stated that it was "a declaration of such simplicity and of
 such clarity that any patriotic citizen ... be he wet or dry, can stand upon"
 and a declaration upon which the nominee, if elected president, "must"
 also stand. "This proposal," Glass wrote to his friend Bernard Baruch, "was
 adopted by the convention ... amid great enthusiasm."10
 Any enthusiasm Senator Glass might have felt was quickly dampened
 when Governor Smith's telegram accepting the party's nomination was read
 to the convention. In this "wet telegram" Smith praised the party platform
 and pledged, if elected, to protect and defend the Constitution and laws
 of the United States. He also restated his views on the prohibition question
 by calling for "fundamental changes in the present provisions for national
 prohibition" based on "the application of Democratic principles of local
 self-government and states' rights." He believed it "the duty of the chosen
 leader of the people to point the way" to "a sane sensible solution" of the
 problem. There must be no return to "the old evils that grew from the
 saloon" but an advance toward "real temperance, respect for law and
 eradication of the existing evils" of corruption of law enforcement officials
 9 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 24 June, 25 June, 27 June 1928; Virginian-Pilot and Norfolk
 Landmark, 29 June 1928. At the state convention the party leaders had decided that the delegation
 would not be bound by the unit rule, apparently a conciliatory gesture to the Smith supporters.
 Governor Smith chose Sen. Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, a Protestant and a dry, as his vice-
 presidential running mate.
 10 Julia E. Caldwell, "The Presidential Election of 1928 in Virginia" (M.A. thesis, Howard
 University, 1953), pp. 22-26; Charles A. Greathouse, comp., Official Report of the Proceedings of
 the Democratic National Convention (Houston, 1928), pp. 197, 203-4; Roy V. Peel and Thomas
 C. Donnelly, The 1928 Campaign: An Analysis (1931; reprint ed., Westport, 1975), p. 165;
 Carter Glass to Bernard M. Baruch, 3 July 1928; Glass to R. Walton Moore, 2 July 1928, Glass
 Papers.
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 and lawlessness. What Smith was suggesting was an amendment to the
 Volstead Act to give additional powers to the states.11
 When asked about Smith's statement by reporters, Senator Glass tried
 to make the best of the situation. "It was a good letter," he said, "typical
 of the candor and courage of the writer." In his correspondence, Glass
 expressed his true reaction to Smith's statement. He wrote that the platform
 plank on prohibition was "instantly nullified, as far as its psychological
 effect was concerned, by Governor Smith's telegram to the chairman of the
 convention." It seemed that "Governor Smith still insists upon making the
 supreme issue of the campaign a bitterly controverted question with which
 neither he nor Mr. Hoover can have but little to do if elected." Neverthe-
 less, Glass wrote that he would still support Smith and "do everything I
 possibly can to bring about a Democratic triumph in November."12
 Smith supporters in Virginia found their task made even more difficult by
 Governor Smith's selection of a new chairman for the Democratic National
 Committee. In an effort to attract business support, he chose John J.
 Raskob, a vice-president of E. I. DuPont de Nemours, chairman of the
 finance committee of General Motors, and a director of several large New
 York banks. Raskob was also a wet and a Roman Catholic. In fact, he was
 one of America's most prominent Catholic laymen and had been named
 a Knight of the Order of St. Gregory the Great by Pope Pius XI. Worse
 still, Raskob had been a Republican in politics until he joined Smith's 1924
 gubernatorial campaign.13
 The choice of Raskob stunned many Democrats and seemed to be an
 additional insult to the dry Protestant South. Carter Glass wrote that after
 the convention "nothing was left to us but to come home and appeal to the
 South for party regularity." Then Smith chose "a rank Republican" as
 chairman of the national committee. He could think of "no more deliberate
 or greater insult [that] was ever offered a national political party" than the
 appointment of Raskob. "In these circumstances," Glass concluded, it
 would require "the interposition of God and the entire heavenly host to
 win the ensuing election." While Senator Glass lamented recent develop-
 ments, the wet telegram and the choice of Raskob gave added impetus to an
 11 Greathouse, Official Report, pp. 258-59; Dabney, Dry Messiah, p. 178.
 12 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 30 June 1928; Carter Glass to R. Walton Moore, 2 July 1928;
 Glass to Bernard M. Baruch, 3 July 1928, Glass Papers.
 "Richard O'Connor, The First Hurrah: A Biography of Alfred E. Smith (New York, 1970),
 p. 201; Matthew and Hannah Josephson, Al Smith: Hero of the Cities (Boston, 1969), p. 356;
 Edmund A. Moore, A Catholic Runs for President: The Campaign of 1928 (New York, 1956),
 p. 121.
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 organized movement in the South to bolt the party and support the Re-
 publican ticket of Herbert Hoover and Charles Curtis."
 On the day the Democratic National Convention adjourned, two well-
 known Protestant clergymen of the South, Rev. Dr. Arthur J. Barton, a
 Baptist and vice-chairman of the Anti-Saloon League of America, and
 Bishop James Cannon, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, raised
 the standard of revolt against the Smith nomination. They issued a call
 to dry southern Democrats to meet at Asheville, North Carolina, on 11 July
 "to organize ... for the defeat of the wet Tammany candidate for President,
 Governor Smith." The conference of anti-Smith Democrats, which actually
 convened on 18 July, was attended by 267 Democrats from fourteen south-
 ern states. The anti-Smith Democrats adopted a "Declaration of Principles
 and Purposes" which listed four reasons for their opposition to Smith:
 Governor Smith's repudiation of the Houston platform on prohibition (the
 wet telegram); Governor Smith's wet record; Governor Smith's selection of
 a wet Republican as chairman of the National Democratic Committee;
 Governor Smith's relationship to Tammany Hall. This document did not
 mention Smith's religion; however, J. Fred Essary, chief of the Baltimore
 Suns Washington bureau, reported from Asheville that four-fifths of the
 delegates admitted privately that Smith's religion was their primary motive
 for opposing him and his "wetness" was only a secondary factor.1*
 After the Asheville Conference, Bishop Cannon, although in ill health,
 devoted his energies to the anti-Smith campaign on a full-time basis. He
 established headquarters in Richmond and traveled throughout Virginia
 forming anti-Smith clubs. The members of these clubs were required to sign
 pledge cards declaring that the signer would "vote and work against the
 election of Alfred E. Smith to the presidency of the United States." Al-
 though Cannon's wife was gravely ill, he embarked on an intensive speaking
 schedule in Virginia and other southern states.16
 Bishop Cannon denied repeatedly that he opposed Governor Smith on
 religious grounds, but he raised the religious issue at every opportunity. As
 Cannon's biographer, Virginius Dabney, has written, "The religious issue
 14 Carter Glass to R. L. Ailworth, 14 July 1928; Glass to Josephus Daniels, 16 July 1928, Glass
 Papers.
 15 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 30 June 1928; Dixon Merritt, "The Asheville Convention,"
 Outlook, CXUX (1 Aug. 1928), 543; Dabney, Dry Messiah, pp. 179-80; 'Declaration of Prin-
 ciples and Purposes of The Conference of Anti-Smith Democrats," John Garland Pollard Papers,
 Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg.
 16 Dabney, Dry Messiah, p. 179; Caldwell, "Presidential Election of 1928 in Virginia," p. 43;
 Form letter, Headquarters Committee, Anti-Smith Democrats to "Dry Fellow-Worker," n.d.,
 Pollard Papers.
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 became paramount in the states in which Bishop Cannon operated." During
 the latter stages of the campaign Cannon spoke in all parts of Virginia.
 Describing Smith as a man who drank "from four to eight cocktails a day,"
 the bishop ridiculed Raskob as "this wet Roman Catholic Knight of
 Columbus and chamberlain of the Pope of Rome." Shortly before the elec-
 tion Cannon wrote a fiery tract against the Catholic church, and especially
 the Pope, entided "Is Southern Protestantism More Intolerant Than Ro-
 manism?" Although some newspapers refused to publish it, others accepted
 it as a paid advertisement. The tract was also issued as a pamphlet. Ac-
 cording to Cannon, about 148,000 copies were distributed in Virginia.
 Appearing so late in the campaign that there was no opportunity to answer
 it, Cannon's final blast had an incalculable effect.17
 While the anti-Smith Democrats and the Republicans were busy organiz-
 ing the state in July and August, the Democratic leadership was strangely
 silent. Immediately after the convention, they spoke optimistically of Smith's
 carrying Virginia after a tough campaign, though by a smaller majority than
 that enjoyed by recent Democratic presidential nominees in the state.
 Litde more was heard from the leadership until late August. The Richmond
 Times-Dispatch commented editorially on 7 August that to win the elec-
 tion in Virginia loyal Democrats must work and "they have not been
 working up to this moment." Complacency could easily "turn the State
 topsy-turvy politically." The Democratic leadership was not, in fact, com-
 pletely inactive during this period. State Chairman J. Murray Hooker
 was writing to local leaders across the state and learning from them opinion
 about the Smith nomination in the cities and counties. He also opened a
 headquarters at Murphy's Hotel in Richmond. Although he maintained a
 public silence during July and most of August, Hooker was anything but
 complacent.18
 Chairman Hooker was so alarmed by the reports he was receiving of Vir-
 ginia Democrats' reaction to the Smith nomination that he decided to alert
 the party's nominees to the situation in the Old Dominion. He wrote to
 Sen. Joseph T. Robinson, the vice-presidential nominee, and Herbert H.
 Lehman, chairman of the Finance Committee of the Democratic National
 Committee, who was a close friend of Al Smith. Hooker informed Robin-
 son, 'The Democrats in this State?many of them?are sorely disappointed
 17 Dabney, Dry Messiah, pp. 179-86, 286; James Cannon, Jr., 'Is Southern Protestantism More
 Intolerant Than Romanism?," Pollard Papers.
 18 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 1 July, 11 July, 7 Aug. 1928; J. Murray Hooker to Joseph T.
 Robinson, 19 July 1928, Glass Papers.
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 and many are in open revolt and actively and openly opposing Governor
 Smith's election. This is peculiarly true of the dry people and the church
 people." Hooker stated that he had discussed the situation with all the
 Democratic leaders, including Governor Byrd, and had concluded that "we
 are in grave danger of losing Virginia's electoral vote." The state chairman
 admitted that the party was putting on a "bold front," but if conditions did
 not improve he feared the worst. His letter to Herbert Lehman was similar
 in content to the Robinson letter with an additional comment on Bishop
 Cannon. He informed the New Yorker that Cannon lived in Richmond
 and "is personally known to practically all church people of the Protestant
 denominations in this State. He is an astute worker and is causing us much
 trouble."19
 Hooker's apprehension concerning Smith's chances in Virginia raises the
 question why the Democratic leadership remained silent during July and
 three weeks of August. After the election there was criticism in the press
 of "the apparent lethargy of the Democratic leaders" during this period. The
 Petersburg Progress-Index remarked that the leaders were "too slow in
 bestirring themselves to start the campaign" while the Norfolk Ledger-
 Dispatch commented that for many weeks "the Democratic batde in Vir-
 ginia was being fought by the press alone... while the Democratic leaders
 held themselves aloof in dignified silence." This would not have been as
 damaging, the Norfolk newspaper concluded, "if Bishop Cannon and his
 cohorts had not taken advantage of the apparent lethargy of the Demo-
 cratic leaders."20
 The Democratic leaders remained silent during July and August because
 they were waiting for Governor Smith's speech formally accepting the
 Democratic nomination. In the wet telegram to the Democratic convention,
 he had promised that he would make a full statement of his views on the
 issues in his acceptance speech. Smith experienced difficulties composing
 the speech which was to be delivered on a coast-to-coast radio hook-up.
 Finally he made his acceptance address on 22 August?almost two months
 after his nomination.21
 19 J. Murray Hooker to Joseph T. Robinson, 19 July 1928; Hooker to Herbert H. Leaman
 [sic], 19 July 1928, Glass Papers; Alan J. Lichtman, Prejudice and the Old Politics: The Presi-
 dential Election of 1928 (Chapel Hill, 1979), p. 82. Herbert H. Lehman served as governor of
 New York (1933-42) and as United States senator from New York (1949-57).
 20 Petersburg Progress-Index, 9 Nov. 1928; Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 1 Nov. 1928. The leaders'
 silence prompted the Richmond Times-Dispatch to inquire about their attitude in the approaching
 campaign. Both United States senators and the ten members of the House of Representatives in-
 dicated they would support the entire Democratic ticket.
 21 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 23 Aug. 1928; O'Connor, First Hurrah, p. 204. The Democrats
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 Before Smith's acceptance speech, the leaders of the Virginia Democratic
 party attempted to influence him on the politically volatile issue of prohibi-
 tion. On 10 August Governor Byrd wrote to the nominee and Governor
 Smith responded quickly. Unfortunately, Byrd's letter has not survived,
 but it is possible to learn something of its content from Smith's reply and
 a letter written by Senator Glass also on 10 August. Glass wrote that he
 had received "a few moments ago" a long-distance telephone call from
 Governor Byrd who had just concluded a party conference attended also by
 Chairman Hooker and Democratic leaders from every congressional district
 in the state. Byrd had said that he was "completely convinced that, should
 Governor Smith persist in his purpose to advocate a modification of the
 Eighteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, Virginia's electoral
 vote may as well be counted for Hoover." It would not be unreasonable
 to assume that Byrd communicated this thought to Governor Smith in his
 letter of the same date. Smith responded that he was "deeply grateful" for
 Byrd's "frank and clear letter of August the tenth," and had given "the
 most careful thought to the arguments" he had made. "I realize," Smith
 continued, "that I must in the last analysis decide the question in the light
 of my own conviction and what I believe will be best for the party and
 the country." If Byrd had suggested that Smith be discreet on the prohibi-
 tion question, his suggestion had been politely refused.22
 Senator Glass had also decided to make a direct appeal to Al Smith on
 the prohibition question. He had received a letter from the nominee inviting
 him to Albany for his "advice and counsel." Glass was not optimistic that
 Smith would take his advice, but he supposed that he could not refuse to
 go "without subjecting myself to the charge of being churlish and un-
 sportsmanlike." On the evening of 14 August the two men conferred at
 Albany. Glass realized quickly that his trip had been "futile." Governor
 Smith believed that the South would remain loyal to the Democratic party
 followed the time-honored practice of formally notifying their nominee of his selection. Smith's
 wet telegram to the convention was an unofficial acceptance because he had not yet been officially
 notified.
 22 Carter Glass to Pat Harrison, 10 Aug. 1928, Glass Papers; Alfred E. Smith to Harry F. Byrd,
 13 Aug. 1928, Harry F. Byrd Papers, ViU. There is a gap in the Byrd Papers for the guberna-
 torial years 1926-30, although a few items from 1928, such as Governor Smith's letter, appear in
 scrapbooks. Neither Byrd's Executive Papers at the Virginia State Library, nor his correspondence
 with his friend William T. Reed in the Reed Family Papers at the Virginia Historical Society,
 nor the papers of his political confidant E. R. Combs at the University of Virginia Library con-
 tain any material relating to the 1928 campaign. Governor Smith left few personal papers. It is
 believed that he destroyed all but official correspondence before he left the governorship in 1929.
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 "whether it wants to or not, regardless of anything that may be proposed in
 the address of acceptance."23
 When he returned to Virginia, Glass wrote a confidential letter to Gov-
 ernor Byrd. The senator was still wondering why Smith had invited him
 because he had already decided what his prohibition proposals would be and
 his acceptance speech was printed and awaiting distribution to the press.
 Glass remarked, "No argument or statement of facts availed anything." He
 had told him "the plain truth about the situation in Virginia and other
 Southern states in terms of severest frankness." Talk about repealing or
 radically modifying the Eighteenth Amendment was "absolute futility"
 because such changes "could not be done in a century." To risk a presi-
 dential election on such an impossible proposition was, in Glass's words, "a
 piece of damn folly." He had warned the candidate of the consequences
 which his proposals would produce, but "I had as well have talked against
 the storm which recendy swept the Adantic coast." It was such a "gceat
 pity," Glass concluded, because the acceptance speech was "in all other
 respects... highly creditable to Governor Smith."24
 When Smith delivered his acceptance address on 22 August, it soon be-
 came apparent that he would not compromise his views on prohibition.
 After pledging to enforce the law as it was, he offered two specific proposals
 for change based on "the fearless application of Jeffersonian principles."
 First, he called for "an amendment to the Volstead Law giving a scientific
 definition of the alcoholic content of an intoxicating beverage. Each state
 could then set its own standard of alcoholic content provided that the stan-
 dard did not exceed the maximum fixed by Congress. This would provide "im-
 mediate relief," but Smith would go further. He advocated a change in the
 Eighteenth Amendment whereby each state after approval in a popular
 referendum would have the right to manufacture and sell alcoholic beverages
 within its borders. Consumption would not be permitted in a public place.
 Interstate shipment of alcoholic beverages would remain a crime. These
 were the "fundamental changes" in prohibition to which Smith had re-
 ferred in his wet telegram to the Democratic National Convention. He
 had conceded nothing to the dry South, and it was on this note that the
 Smith campaign began in Virginia.26
 Although the party leaders knew that Governor Smith's proposed changes
 23 Carter Glass to Josephus Daniels, 9 Aug. 1928; Glass to Pat Harrison, 16 Aug. 1928, Glass
 Papers.
 2* Carter Glass to Harry F. Byrd, 16 Aug. 1928, Glass Papers.
 25 Alfred E. Smith, Campaign Addresses of Governor Alfred JE. Smith (Washington, D.C,
 1929), pp. 12-15.
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 in prohibition would be unsatisfactory to most Virginians, they prepared to
 launch his campaign. At a meeting of the party leadership in Richmond on
 Friday, 17 August, a motion was passed unanimously that Senators Glass
 and Swanson and Governor Byrd would make "strong statements com-
 menting on Governor Smith's speech of acceptance." Byrd informed Glass
 by telegram about this action and added: "Think this important and am now
 preparing my statement. Hope you will do the same." Chairman Hooker
 also wired Glass with the same message. The irascible senator agreed to
 issue a statement, but warned that he had "no idea of subscribing to Gov-
 ernor Smith's foolish proposal to reopen the prohibition question."26
 The Richmond Times-Dispatch hailed Byrd's lengthy statement in sup-
 port of Al Smith as a "call to arms." Byrd's statement is important for two
 reasons. The governor was already coming to be recognized as the "actual
 and titular Democratic leader of Virginia." Secondly, his speech clearly
 outlined the Democratic strategy for the remainder of the campaign. Byrd
 stated that opposition to Smith in Virginia was based on three points:
 "He is wet, a Catholic and a Tammany man." On the Tammany connec-
 tion, Byrd stated that no Tammany scandal had touched Smith. On the
 temperance question he refused to discuss the merits of Smith's prohibition
 proposals, but he remarked that "there is not the least chance of either
 repeal or modification of the Eighteenth Amendment in the probable life
 of Governor Smith." Byrd pointed out that he himself was a dry but he
 could nonetheless support the nominee because Governor Smith had
 pledged to enforce the law. On Smith's religion, Byrd reminded Virginians
 of "the immortal statute of Thomas Jefferson." He could not believe that
 Virginians would apply "a religious test for holding public office." He
 stressed Smith's outstanding record as governor of New York but concluded
 with what became a major theme of the campaign?a plea for party loyalty.
 "A Republican victory in Virginia in a national election," Byrd warned,
 would be "the entering wedge for a Republican victory in State affairs."
 He recalled that Virginia owed to the Democratic party both white suprem-
 acy and "an honest and efficient government unbroken throughout the
 ? 27
 years.
 Governor Byrd's statement made it clear that the Virginia Democratic
 26 Harry F. Byrd to Carter Glass, 20 Aug. 1928; J. Murray Hooker to Glass, 21 Aug. 1928;
 Glass to Hooker, 22 Aug. 1928, Glass Papers.
 27 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 24 Aug. 1928; Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 3 Oct. 1928. The text
 of Byrd's statement is in the Byrd Papers. Governor Byrd referred to the statute for religious free-
 dom passed by the General Assembly in 1786. The law guaranteed freedom of religion and dis-
 established the Anglican church in Virginia.
This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:11:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Rum, Romanism, and Virginia Democrats 415
 party leadership would give more than perfunctory support to the Smith
 candidacy. It also counteracted a rumor being spread by the anti-Smith
 Democrats that the party leaders, while maintaining a facade of party loyalty,
 were secredy opposed to the nominee.28
 Senator Glass released his statement on the same day that Governor Byrd
 made his views public. Glass praised the nominee's speech of acceptance in
 all respects but one. He was unsparing in his denunciation of Smith's pro-
 posals relating to prohibition. Glass excoriated the Republicans for the "worst
 record of thievery and corruption and organized maladministration of gpv-
 ernment that ever disgraced any political regime in the history of the
 American republic." He would preserve his party regularity, join in the
 campaign, and support Smith "in spite of his impossible proposal" on prohibi-
 tion "rather than because of it."29
 Two days later Sen. Claude Swanson, who was a candidate for reelection
 in 1928, issued his statement endorsing Smith's candidacy. Swanson, like
 Glass, praised Smith's record as governor of New York and his acceptance
 speech, but dissented from the nominee's prohibition views. While he
 admired Smith's candor and courage in expressing his beliefs, the Virginian
 would be bound by the statements on prohibition contained in the plat-
 form adopted at Roanoke. 'The man and opportunity have met," Swanson
 concluded optimistically, "and the election of Governor Smith seems
 assured."80
 The statements by Byrd, Glass, and Swanson were the beginning of one
 of the most intensive campaigns ever waged by the Virginia Democratic
 organization in behalf of a Democratic presidential nominee. Governor Byrd
 and State Chairman Hooker directed the campaign. The main thrust was
 speeches delivered by prominent Democrats at political meetings. A speak-
 ers' bureau chaired by Del. Thomas W. Ozlin of Lunenburg assigned
 speakers. By mid-October, according to the Richmond Times-Dispatch, "the
 hottest and most intensive speaking campaign in Virginia's political history"
 was "in full swing." Delegate Ozlin estimated that fifty speakers per day
 were orating in behalf of Al Smith. All Democratic state and national office-
 holders had endorsed Smith and were supporting him with varying degrees
 of enthusiasm. The party leadership's efforts were successful in bringing
 about the appearance of unity among Democratic members of the General
 Assembly and Democratic local officeholders. Of thirty-eight Democratic
 ** Richmond Times-Dispatch, 24 Aug. 1928.
 ??Ibid.
 ?Ibid., 26 Aug. 1928.
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 members of the Virginia Senate only one, Sen. R. H. Stubbs of Saluda, in
 Middlesex County, refused to support Smith, according to a Times-Dispatch
 survey in mid-October. The newspaper also reported that ninety-two of
 the ninety-seven Democrats in the House of Delegates were understood to
 be supporting Smith. During the summer it had appeared that as many as
 twenty-five members of the House might refuse to support the nominee.81
 City and county officials also seemed to be falling in line behind the party
 leadership after early indications that there would be substantial defections.
 The state committee adopted a resolution asking the congressional district
 committees to adopt resolutions supporting the party nominees and requiring
 individuals to declare their support or resign from the committees. Demo-
 cratic city and county committees were similarly purged of members who
 refused to support Smith. G. W. Lineweaver, political reporter for the
 Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, wrote that "for the first time since 1896 the Demo-
 cratic state organization is stirred into getting out its vote by a systematic
 canvass in the state at large." Although the Democratic leaders were late
 getting started, they had created "the most perfect [precinct] organization
 since the fight against Mahone in the 80's."32
 Despite the increased Democratic activity, the leaders continued to receive
 gloomy reports from around the state. Congressman Clifton A. Woodrum
 wrote on 20 September that in Roanoke and the rest of the Sixth District
 "we are in imminent danger of seeing a very substantial majority registered
 for the Republican nominee." The Republicans were furnishing the fi-
 nances while "a coalition of the Klan, the Churches, and bolting Demo-
 crats" were carrying on the fight for the Republican party. Governor Byrd
 informed Carter Glass that the Democrats were having a "hard fight" in
 the Seventh District in the Shenandoah Valley and that Congressman
 Thomas W. Harrison might be defeated. There were also serious problems
 in the Tidewater districts. Byrd believed the situation in the First District
 was the "worst in the State." He and Congressman S. Otis Bland agreed
 that unless something were done, the district would go Republican. In the
 Second District Norman R. Hamilton, publisher of the Portsmouth Star,
 pleaded with Senator Glass to speak in Portsmouth and in the upper coun-
 ties of the district. Hamilton wrote that "we are up against a strong com-
 bination of old line' Republicans, Kluxism and Cannonism."3S
 ? Ibid., 19 Oct., 23 Oct., 26 Oct. 1928.
 32 Ibid., 23 Oct. 1928; Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 Sept., 15 Sept., 16 Sept. 1928.
 33 Clifton A. Woodrum to Carter Glass, 20 Sept. 1928; Harry F. Byrd to Glass, 14 Sept. 1928;
 Byrd to Glass, 26 Sept. 1928; Norman R. Hamilton to Glass, 15 Oct. 1928, Glass Papers. Al-
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 On the hustings Carter Glass was a master of colorful political invective.
 He was undoubtedly the most sought-after speaker by local party officials
 arranging meetings for the Smith campaign. He entered the campaign in
 September "with a passion without precedent in all the years of his po-
 litical life." Since he had made only a token effort in 1924 in behalf of
 his personal friend John W. Davis, the extent of his involvement in the
 Smith campaign was surprising, especially after Smith's proposals relating
 to prohibition. Glass's passionate involvement, however, can be explained
 in part by the campaign activities of Bishop James Cannon and the threat
 Cannon posed to the leadership of the Virginia Democratic party.84
 The long-standing enmity between Glass and his fellow Methodist,
 Bishop Cannon, dated from the 1909 Democratic gubernatorial primary.
 The two subsequently clashed in primaries held in 1911 and in 1917.
 Cannon repeatedly threw his support in opposition to Glass. Glass's nega-
 tive opinion of Cannon had crystallized by 1918. "If the devil fails to get...
 [Cannon]," Glass wrote, "he will not be on his job."35
 From 14 September until the end of the campaign, Glass traversed the
 commonwealth speaking for the Smith-Robinson ticket. The schedule put
 him under a "frightful strain." Despite his fatigue, Glass agreed late in the
 campaign to trail Republican Sen. William E. Borah, who was speaking for
 Hoover in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Glass opened the
 campaign with a speech at Danville on 14 September. He attacked Herbert
 Hoover, the Republican party, and Bishop Cannon in terms that soon
 became familiar to newspaper readers. Glass believed it had been "a great
 meeting" and "one of the most enthusiastic audiences I ever addressed in
 Virginia." The senator made his principal speech of the campaign to
 approximately 5,000 cheering Democrats at the Richmond City Auditorium
 on 23 October. The address was supposed to be a reply to a speech delivered
 in Richmond the previous week by Senator Borah. The Idaho senator had
 denied Hoover's responsibility for fixing the price of wheat in the Middle
 though the Ku Klux Klan was not as influential in Virginia as in many other states, it was active
 in the state at this time and had especially large klaverns in Richmond and Roanoke (David M.
 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, pp. 230-35; Kenneth T. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the
 City, 1915-1930 [New York, 1967], pp. 81-82).
 54 Rixey Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass: A Biography (New York, 1939), p. 284;
 Michael S. Patterson, 'The Fall of a Bishop: James Cannon, Jr., Versus Carter Glass, 1909-1934,"
 Journal of Southern History, XXXIX (1973), 498. Box 253 of the Glass Papers contains invita-
 tions to speak from throughout Virginia, as well as many from beyond the borders of the com-
 monwealth.
 "Patterson, "Fall of a Bishop," JSH, XXXIX (1973), 494-96; Carter Glass to A. F. Thomas,
 11 July 1918, quoted in Henry C. Ferrell, "Claude A. Swanson of Virginia" (Ph.D. diss., Uni-
 versity of Virginia, 1964), p. 298.
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 West during and after World War I when Hoover served as United States
 Food Administrator. The price-fixing had angered farmers when the prices
 of other commodities were rising. Glass had copies of Borah's own words
 from those years condemning Hoover for the price-fixing policy. A nation-
 wide radio hook-up was arranged for Glass's response to Borah so that his
 words might have their maximum impact in the wheat-growing areas.86
 Glass's speech in Richmond was a compendium of the various themes
 which he struck during the campaign. After rebutting Borah's statements,
 he launched a vitriolic attack on the Republican administrations of the past
 seven and one-half years. Denying that Al Smith had repudiated the pro-
 hibition plank of the Democratic platform, Glass denounced Bishop Cannon
 in bitter terms. Virginians must be warned not against a Roman Pope but
 against a "Virginia Pope" and his allies "who are now seeking to transform
 the Methodist Church, South, into the Methodist Republican Church,
 South." The anti-Smith group, Glass declared, was threatening him with
 political defeat because he was supporting Smith. His response was that
 "whenever the people of Virginia want a Senator who will bow the knee to
 tyrannical ecclesiastical authority, they can't have me any longer." The sena-
 tor also gave his opinion of those who were appealing to religious prejudice.
 "Cowards that they are," he thundered, "they're willing for the Catholic boys
 to give up their lives for their country but they're not willing for them
 to hold office."37
 Several weeks before his speech in Richmond, Senator Glass had been
 quick to denounce the "Caldwell letter," one of many manifestations of
 religious prejudice in an increasingly ugly campaign. Mrs. Willie W.
 Caldwell, Virginia's Republican national committeewoman, wrote a circular
 letter to Republican women to inspire their campaign efforts. The letter
 contained the following paragraph:
 Mr. Hoover himself and the National Committee are depending on the women
 to save our country in this hour of very vital moral religious crisis. We must save
 the United States from being Romanized and rum-ridden, and the call is to the
 women to do something.
 One of the recipients of the letter was Mrs. Clara R. Lyon of Virginia
 Highlands, who had been made vice-chairman of her precinct without her
 36 Carter Glass to Pat Harrison, 12 Oct. 1928; Glass to Norman R. Hamilton, 24 Nov. 1928;
 Glass to Robert L. Ailworth, 15 Sept. 1928, Glass Papers; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 15 Sept.,
 15 Oct., 24 Oct. 1928; Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston, 1975),
 p. 64; James E. Palmer, Jr., Carter Glass: Unreconstructed Rebel (Roanoke, 1938), p. 207.
 *7 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 24 Oct. 1928.
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 knowledge or consent. Mrs. Lyon gave the letter to the Washington Post
 for publication. The letter caused a national furor and prompted Herbert
 Hoover to address the religious issue directly. "Whether this letter is au-
 thentic or a forgery," he declared, "it does violence to every instinct that
 I possess. I resent and repudiate it." Glass responded caustically: "Mrs.
 Caldwell was indiscreet enough to write exactly what every Republican
 campaign whisperer is saying and what many political preachers who traffic
 in notoriety and make merchandise of religion are proclaiming from plat-
 form and pulpit." Candidate Hoover did not have to "sanction such out-
 breaks of religious hate. Nevertheless, he is the beneficiary of them."88
 Senator Glass and the other Democratic leaders found the "outbreaks of
 religious hate" difficult to combat. Many of Governor Smith's opponents
 said that they did not oppose him on religious grounds, but they referred
 to the Catholic church repeatedly as a danger to the country. Some feared
 that the church hierarchy would unduly influence Smith in his decisions
 as president. Others attacked Smith openly on religious grounds. The
 Ku Klux Klan organ, the Fellowship Forum, containing virulent anti-
 Catholic articles, was widely distributed in the state. The bogus Knights
 of Columbus oath made its appearance. According to the fraudulent oath,
 fourth-degree members of the Knights of Columbus pledged to wage a
 "relentless war" of mutilation and extermination against "all heretics,
 Protestants and Masons."
 Virginius Dabney reported in the Richmond Times-Dispatch that stories
 were told about the Pope's plans to seize control of the United States gov-
 ernment if Al Smith were elected. The pontiff also allegedly intended to
 reside in Washington, D. C, on the heights of Georgetown where die
 "papal artillery" could overawe the Congress, the courts, and the rest of the
 federal government. In Norfolk gruesome scenes of torture alleged to have
 been inflicted during the Spanish Inquisition were displayed in a store on
 the city's principal commercial thoroughfare until they were removed by
 order of the city manager. A Times-Dispatch correspondent reported from
 Roanoke that the Ku Klux Klan was "powerful and thriving" and had
 done "more extensive and more effective political work outside its ranks"
 there than anywhere else in the state. "If Hoover carries the town," the
 reporter concluded, "the Klan, to a large extent, will carry it for him."
 Finally, the "political preachers" were busy Sunday after Sunday warning
 of the dangers of "Roman domination" inherent in the Smith candidacy.
 38 Moore, A Catholic Runs for President, pp. 146-47; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 1 Oct. 1928.
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 Looking back on the campaign, Carter Glass could write that "never since
 free government was known on earth, has there been a political campaign
 comparable in cheap depravity to that which we have recently passed
 through."39
 With the exception of Senator Glass, no Democratic leader exerted as
 much effort in Smith's behalf as Gov. Harry F. Byrd. G. W. Lineweaver
 described him as the "dominating figure" in the Smith campaign in Vir-
 ginia. Byrd confined his speech-making to October and early November;
 however, he seems to have coordinated the campaign from the beginning
 in late August. Byrd's first speech, a radio address broadcast over WRVA
 in Richmond on 1 October was entitled "The Real Issue In This Cam-
 paign: What the Continuation of Our Democratic State Government Means
 to Virginia." The "paramount issue" for Virginians, Byrd declared, "is
 to preserve our progress under the continued control of your state govern-
 ment by the Democratic party and to preserve Virginia's place as a Demo-
 cratic state in the councils of that party and in the Congress of the nation."
 He believed Virginia's unparalleled development would be jeopardized if
 Bishop Cannon succeeded "in delivering Virginia to the Republicans."
 During Byrd's administration the Republican party had adopted "the
 policy of a common scold," criticizing all of his actions, while proposing no
 remedies of its own. If the Republicans won in Virginia in 1928, their
 leaders would realize that their victory depended on Bishop Cannon and
 they would be tempted to continue the alliance so that "the combination
 may dictate the next governor."40
 Governor Byrd cited two other dangers to Virginia if the state voted
 Republican. No longer could Virginians and other southern Democrats
 expect the "cordial co-operation of Northern Democrats in Congress" if they
 deserted their party leader because he happened to be a Catholic and had
 a different philosophy "on the best method to promote temperance and
 sobriety." Secondly, Byrd raised the timeworn race issue. He quoted ex-
 tensively from remarks by Republican Congressman Le?nidas C. Dyer of
 3? Caldwell, "Presidential Election of 1928 in Virginia," pp. 44, 47; Richmond Times-Dispatch,
 16 July, 5 Aug., 16 Sept., 26 Sept., 14 Oct., 30 Oct. 1928; U. S., Congress, Congressional
 Record, 62d Cong., 3d sess. (1912-13), 3216; Virginian-Pilot and Norfolk landmark, 26
 Sept. 1928; Carter Glass to Robert L. Ailworth, 23 Nov. 1928, Glass Papers. Hoover received
 6,471 votes in the city of Roanoke and Smith 4,018. The full text of the bogus Knights of
 Columbus oath appears in the Congressional Record as cited above.
 40 Norfolk Ledg?r-Dispatch, 11 Sept. 1928; text of speech by Harry F. Byrd, 1 Oct. 1928,
 Byrd Papers. Byrd stated that the Republicans and the Anti-Saloon League might enter an inde-
 pendent ticket in the 1929 state election if they were victorious in 1928. In 1929 the anti-Smith
 Democrats and the Republicans did unite to sponsor a ticket as Byrd had forecast.
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 Missouri, who had called for a new force bill to guarantee blacks in the
 southern states their rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments
 and "place them on an equality with all other races." Byrd proclaimed that
 these words were "a frank warning from a Republican leader of what the
 South may expect" if it deserted the Democratic ticket and was left de-
 fenseless against its "sectional enemies" in Congress. Governor Byrd devoted
 only one paragraph of his speech to Al Smith and his accomplishments as
 governor of New York. The Virginia leader had concluded that the best
 strategy was a negative one?an appeal to the voters' fears.41
 A highlight of the campaign for loyal Virginia Democrats was Al Smith's
 brief visit to Richmond on 11 October. Smith received a tumultuous recep-
 tion in the state capital. Thousands waited at Broad Street Station for his
 train which was forty-five minutes late. Thousands more lined the streets
 along the motorcade route and overflowed Capitol Square. After Governor
 Byrd's welcoming address, Smith delivered brief remarks expressing his
 appreciation for such a cordial reception. He declined to make a formal
 speech to save his vocal power for an address that night. As Smith de-
 scended the Capitol steps, he was mobbed by admirers before he could
 make his way to the Governor's Mansion. Harry Byrd, pleased by the
 reception given the nominee, stated optimistically that it indicated Smith
 would receive "a substantial majority in Virginia."42
 It was easy to overestimate the significance of the enthusiastic welcome
 accorded Governor Smith in Richmond. The crowds were large, and Smith
 had many admirers who were ecstatic over the opportunity to be near him
 and perhaps shake his hand. Many people along the street and in the
 windows of the office buildings, however, were merely curious. According
 to Horace Edwards, who was then a young attorney in Richmond and a
 worker in the Smith campaign, "Everybody wanted to see the fellow
 [Smith]. He was fascinating. While they didnlt like him and so much
 was being said about him they just wanted to see him." Curiosity, however,
 did not necessarily translate into votes.43
 After Governor Smith's visit, the campaign entered its climactic phase.
 Harry Byrd began a series of seventeen addresses in Southwest Virginia and
 41 Text of speech by Harry F. Byrd, 1 Oct. 1928, Byrd Papers. Congressman Le?nidas C. Dyer
 served in the House of Representatives from 1911 to 1914 and 1915 to 1933.
 42 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 12 Oct. 1928; Virginian-Pilot and Norfolk Landmark, 12 Oct.
 1928.
 48 Virginius Dabney, interview, 8 Mar. 1979, Richmond, Va.; Horace Edwards, interview, 29
 July 1977, Richmond, Va. Edwards served as Democratic state chairman (1940-48) and mayor
 of Richmond (1946-48). He was an unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic gubernatorial
 nomination in the 1949 primary.
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 the Shenandoah Valley. At Abingdon he attacked those responsible for the
 anonymous "whispering campaign" being conducted against Smith. In
 Woodstock he appealed to his audience to uphold the traditions of Virginia
 and stand by the Democratic party. Large friendly audiences listened to
 Byrd in the northern part of the Shenandoah Valley at Front Royal and
 Luray. The governor believed the crowds were a positive sign. The Valley,
 however, was Byrd's home territory and the people were understandably
 proud of their native son's performance as governor. The large crowds were
 more a tribute to Harry Byrd than a show of enthusiasm for Al Smith.44
 In the last days of the campaign Governor Byrd spoke in some of the
 state's largest cities. In Richmond he affirmed that if Smith were to forsake
 his religion, "I would not have the same respect for the man." The governor
 concluded his campaigning with speeches at Staunton and Winchester
 where he pleaded again for party loyalty. Speaking in Staunton, Woodrow
 Wilson's birthplace, Byrd described in emotional language his contribution
 to the campaign:
 When I cross the river and stand at the gates of St. Peter I hope to see Woodrow
 Wilson face to face. I want to be able to say to him that, in the hour of Democ-
 racy's greatest trial, when her enemies are stabbing the party from within and
 without, that I fought the good fight for the existence of the Democratic Party.
 If I had not done all that I could in this hour, then I would turn and hide my
 face in shame.45
 Governor Byrd had fought the good fight. Although his speeches were
 somewhat negative and defensive, he had spoken out against the purveyors
 of religious hate. He and State Chairman J. Murray Hooker had also been
 able to recruit for the Democratic campaign a prominent Baptist layman?
 John Garland Pollard?who proved to be an eloquent champion of religious
 liberty.46
 During the final three weeks of the campaign former Attorney General
 Pollard delivered fifteen speeches in eastern Virginia for the Smith-Robinson
 ticket. Pollard, who was serving as dean of the Department of Government
 and Citizenship at the College of William and Mary, brought two distinct
 assets to the campaign: his reputation as a dry and his prominence in an
 evangelical Protestant denomination. Pollard announced that he would
 44 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 16 Oct., 24 Oct., 28 Oct. 1928.
 4* Richmond Times-Dispatch, 31 Oct., 1 Nov., 4 Nov. 1928; Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 30
 Oct. 1928.
 "Harry F. Byrd to John Garland Pollard, 24 Sept. 1928; Pollard to J. Murray Hooker, 11
 Sept. 1928, Pollard Papers.
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 appeal to reason and not to passion. In his speeches, he emphasized the
 issues of prohibition and religious liberty. Denying that prohibition was the
 only issue in the campaign, he refused to make Governor Smith's stand on
 it "the sole test of his fitness for office." The former attorney general was
 unsparing in his denunciation of Bishop Cannon. He charged that Cannon
 had consistently supported candidates "who could drink more cocktails than
 Governor Smith could hold."
 On the religious question he poked fun at those "who are creeping up
 from behind and saying to us, 'Boo, the Pope will catch you if you don't
 look out.' " If the Pope could not rule Italy where nine-tenths of the people
 were Catholic, how could he rule America where six-sevenths of the
 people were Protestant. The important point, in Pollard's opinion, was not
 what "others in other times and climes" thought about religious liberty but
 "what Al Smith thinks about it." Smith had "told us in language equalled
 only by Jefferson himself." On the day before the election, Pollard acknowl-
 edged that he had made many new enemies during the campaign, but "I am
 quite willing that it should be thus if I have in any way contributed to the
 great principle of religious liberty."4T
 At some point after Smith's nomination, probably during September,
 Pollard had received an intriguing offer. A delegation of Republicans and
 anti-Smith Democrats proposed that he withdraw his support from Smith
 and run for the governorship in 1929 as an independent Democrat. The
 delegation assured him that he could expect no Republican opposition and
 complete support from anti-Smith Democrats. Rumors of such an offer
 reached the press in late September. Pollard disclosed that he had been
 approached but had declined the offer. "I shall do nothing to jeopardize
 Governor Byrd's progressive program," he declared. "If Virginia should go
 Republican, this program would be in great danger." The offer to Pollard
 indicated that Governor Byrd's fears of an independent state ticket sup-
 ported by the anti-Smith coalition were not groundless.48
 Although the appearance of unity was maintained among the Democratic
 leaders, there was some internal dissension. Senator Glass's senior colleague,
 Claude Swanson, who had no serious opposition for reelection, was not as
 47 Press release, [ca. mid-Oct. 1928], Pollard Papers; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 19 Oct., 20
 Oct., 30 Oct. 1928; John Garland Pollard to Lawton Crutchfield, 5 Nov. 1928, Pollard Papers;
 Hopewell, "An Outsider Looking In," p. 139. Bishop Cannon remembered Pollard's attacks
 years afterward. In his memoirs he wrote, "Next to Senator Glass the most abusive attacks were
 made by Dr. John Garland Pollard" (James Cannon, Jr., Bishop Cannon's Own Story: Life As
 I Have Seen It, ed. Richard L. Watson, Jr. [Durham, 1955], p. 446).
 48 Hopewell, "An Outsider Looking In/' pp. 137-38; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 Sept. 1928.
 Bishop Cannon denied any involvement in the overtures to Pollard.
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 active as Glass or Byrd. Swanson, however, did not play a completely passive
 role. On 11 September he introduced Smith's vice-presidential running-
 mate, Sen. Joseph T. Robinson, when he spoke in Richmond. Swanson also
 delivered several other speeches including one address broadcast over radio
 station WRVA on 2 October. A reporter for a Norfolk newspaper wrote
 that it was the first time in several years that Swanson had spoken in behalf
 of a Democratic nominee. Apparently Governor Byrd did not think that
 this level of activity was enough. After the election Joseph Leslie wrote in
 the Virginian-Pilot and Norfolk Landmark that Byrd and Swanson had
 disagreed "over the manner in which the late presidential campaign in Vir-
 ginia was planned and conducted." According to Virginius Dabney, Byrd
 believed that he had Swanson's commitment to wage an aggressive cam-
 paign for Smith. When Swanson appeared to be making only a modest
 effort, Byrd told Dabney that Swanson had "weasled" on his promise.
 J. Murray Hooker, the final member of the Democratic Big Four, rarely
 made speeches, but he devoted himself to the details of organization. Ac-
 cording to his brother, Judge H. Lester Hooker, the state chairman "did
 everything in the world he could for his [Smith's] election."49
 In the final days of the campaign Bishop Cannon and his allies launched
 a last-minute onslaught against Al Smith on religious grounds. Rev. William
 A. (Billy) Sunday, an itinerant evangelist, delivered several speeches under
 the auspices of the Virginia Anti-Saloon League in which he openly raised
 the religious issue. Governor Byrd found it necessary to issue a statement in
 response to Bishop Cannon's advertisement attacking the Catholic church.50
 Byrd charged that it was "a grave responsibility for Bishop Cannon to
 instill hatred in the hearts of Americans against other Americans merely
 because they choose to worship the same God we worship, but in a different
 way." In his final message to the voters, Byrd remarked that as one of the
 Democratic leaders he had done his best to conduct the campaign "on high
 standards of decency and fair play." Noting that the election would soon
 exist "only in memory," Byrd asked the voters to "erase all feelings of
 bitterness and dislike from our hearts and enshrine there the immortal
 tenets of the Golden Rule?Charity to all and good fellowship."51
 49 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 Aug., 18 Sept., 5 Oct., 10 Oct., 31 Oct. 1928; Vir&nian-
 Pilot and Norfolk Landmark, 4 Oct., 3 Dec. 1928; Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 20 Oct. 1928;
 Dabney interview; H. Lester Hooker, interview, 1 Aug. 1978, Richmond, Va.
 50 See p. 410 and ?. 17.
 51 Dabney, Dry Messiah, p. 185; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 2 Nov., 3 Nov., 4 Nov. 1928.
 William A. (Billy) Sunday, an ordained Presbyterian minister, was a prominent evangelist and
 prohibitionist. Prior to his career in the ministry, he had been a professional baseball player with
 the Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia teams of the National League.
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 In his final preelection statement, Governor Byrd also expressed confidence
 that Virginia's Democrats would be vindicated by a victory in the Old
 Dominion. State Chairman J. Murray Hooker predicted that Al Smith
 would carry the state by not less than 30,000 votes. He declared that "a
 marked drift in sentiment" favorable to Governor Smith had occurred
 during the past two weeks. Democratic victories in the contested congres-
 sional races were also "assured." It is possible to dismiss such statements as
 the ritualistic optimistic forecasts which politicians make before elections.
 According to Virginius Dabney, however, the Democratic leaders genuinely
 believed that Smith's prospects in the state had improved. The warm
 reception given the candidate in Richmond and the large and enthusiastic
 audiences which Governor Byrd and Senator Glass had been attracting were
 interpreted as indications of a trend. In addition, the Democrats believed
 they had assembled the best campaign organization ever seen in the Old
 Dominion.52
 The election results shocked Virginia's Democratic hierarchy. Not since
 1888 had so many Virginians voted in a presidential election. Herbert
 Hoover received 164,609 votes to 140,146 for Al Smith. Perhaps even more
 surprising was the Democrats' loss of three seats in the House of Repre-
 sentatives?in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth districts. The statewide
 turnout of voters in 1928 was 81,350 greater than in the presidential elec-
 tion four years earlier. Governor Smith actually received 430 votes more
 than John W. Davis, the party's nominee in 1924, but Herbert Hoover
 more than doubled President Calvin Coolidge's total in that election. Hoover's
 greater strength was in the urban areas where he received a majority in
 seventeen of Virginia's twenty-three cities. Each candidate received a ma-
 jority in 50 of the state's 100 counties; however, Hoover received 13,717
 of his 24,463-vote majority in the counties. Governor Smith carried only
 one congressional district?the Fourth District on the Southside. In the
 congressional races, incumbents Joseph T. Deal in the Second District and
 Thomas W. Harrison in the Seventh District were defeated as well as
 William H. Rouse, the party's nominee to succeed retiring George Peery in
 the Ninth District. Congressman Joseph Whitehead defeated his Re-
 publican opponent in the Fifth District by only 2,500 votes. Henry St.
 George Tucker was considered in serious jeopardy before late returns pro-
 vided him with a 3,500-vote margin of victory in the Tenth District.58
 02 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 Oct., 4 Nov. 1928.
 53 Moger, Virginia, p. 192; Richmond Times-Dispatch, 7 Nov., 8 Nov. 1928; Eisenberg,
 Virginia Votes, pp. 25, 61-64; Report of the Secretary of the Commonwealth to the Governor
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 It is impossible to determine precisely why Al Smith lost the presidential
 election in Virginia. Empirical evidence does not exist which would estab-
 lish that either Smith's religion or his views on prohibition were the para-
 mount reason. After the election, a veil of silence descended upon the
 Democratic party's leaders. Neither Byrd, Glass, Swanson, nor Hooker
 gave statements to the press. On 14 November Swanson wrote Glass, "I
 have refused to give out interviews or make any statement.... The best
 thing to do now is to be quiet and calm, and appear undisturbed as if nothing
 had occurred." In his private correspondence Carter Glass did not hesitate
 to attribute Smith's defeat to religion. In Glass's words, "The political
 parsons and innate religious prejudices were too much to overcome." Pollard
 and Congressman Tucker also indicated in their correspondence that re-
 ligious intolerance was the decisive factor in Smith's defeat. Governor Byrd
 seems to have turned his attention quickly to the presidential election's
 impact on state politics. "I want you to know I am in favor of no compro-
 mise," he wrote Glass, "with Cannon, Hepburn and the combination that
 tried to destroy the Democratic party." He added that no barriers should be
 erected to prevent the rank and file's return to the party.54
 The question arises: Could the Democratic leadership have prevented
 the political upheaval of 1928 in Virginia? Newspapers in Norfolk and
 Petersburg criticized the leaders after the election for their late start in the
 campaign. Louis I. Jaffe, editor of the Virginian-Pilot and Norfolk Land-
 mark, informed Byrd that he was "one of those who felt that the State
 leaders did not take their coats off soon enough." Byrd responded that
 "perhaps" an earlier start might have been made, but "looking back on
 it, I doubt if anything that any of us could have done would have changed
 the result." Undoubtedly Byrd was right. The forces with which Al Smith
 had to contend in Virginia were too strong, the prejudices too deep-rooted
 to be overcome in one political campaign.55
 and General Assembly of Virginia (Richmond, 1929), pp. 454-56. The total vote for president
 in the 1888 election was 304,087, or 668 votes below the number cast in 1928. In the Second
 District the popular Republican Menalcus Lankford defeated Deal by 18,614 to 14,668. Jacob
 A. Garber, treasurer of Rockingham County, defeated Harrison in the Seventh District by
 15,243 to 15,009 votes. In Southwest Virginia's Ninth District Joseph C. Shaffer received 32,696
 to Rouse's 31,722 votes.
 54 Claude A. Swanson to Carter Glass, 14 Nov. 1928; Glass to W. Albert Smoot, 8 Nov.
 1928; Glass to G. W. Handy, 13 Nov. 1928; Harry F. Byrd to Glass, 18 Nov. 1928, Glass
 Papers; John Garland Pollard to*J. Calvin Moss, 21 Nov. 1928, Pollard Papers; Henry St. George
 Tucker to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 17 Dec. 1928, Files of the Democratic National Committee,
 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Rev. David Hepburn, a longtime ally
 of Cannon, succeeded him as superintendent of the Virginia Anti-Saloon League in 1918.
 55 Petersburg Progress-Index, 9 Nov. 1928; Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 1 Nov. 1928; Louis I.
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 Although Al Smith's prospects for success in Virginia were minimal, the
 strategy employed by the Democratic leaders can be questioned. The
 Democratic campaign was defensive and rather negative, primarily an effort
 to parry the thrusts of Bishop Cannon and other critics of Smith. The
 three principal spokesmen for Smith, Senator Glass, Governor Byrd, and
 John Garland Pollard, had established reputations as staunch prohibitionists.
 Their attempt to persuade the voters that the election of Al Smith posed
 no threat to prohibition may have sounded disingenuous. Senator Glass's
 vitriolic attacks on Bishop Cannon were often counterproductive. G. W.
 Lineweaver of the Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch wrote Pollard during October
 1928 that there was "some criticism of Glass on account of his bitterness,"
 but Lineweaver added, "It served the purpose of stirring up the Democrats."
 While Glass's speeches excited the party faithful, they were undoubtedly
 offensive to many Virginians. Virginius Dabney has recalled that Glass
 "did more harm than good." His intolerance of those who disagreed with
 him and his denunciation of Cannon as "a hypocrite" made Glass a "liability"
 in the campaign. Governor Byrd's statements that Al Smith's defeat in
 Virginia would imperil the progress of the commonwealth also were not
 convincing. The governorship was not on the ballot in 1928, and Demo-
 crats who voted for Hoover could decide later if they wished to continue
 to entrust control of state government to the political organization headed
 by Governor Byrd.56
 Some conclusions emerge from a study of the leadership of the Demo-
 cratic party and the 1928 presidential election in Virginia. The party
 leaders, foreseeing the problems inherent in Smith's candidacy, opposed
 his nomination in the Democratic convention. On the convention roll call
 they supported a man who had no chance of winning the nomination so
 that they would not antagonize Virginia Democrats who objected to Smith.
 After Smith was nominated the leaders made a determined but unsuccessful
 effort to convince him to moderate his views on prohibition prior to his
 address of acceptance. Once Smith officially accepted the nomination, the
 Democratic leaders waged an aggressive campaign in his behalf. The
 speaking tours of Senator Glass and Governor Byrd were the highlights of
 the Smith campaign. Byrd and State Chairman Murray Hooker organized
 the Democratic party down to the precinct level. By 1928 Harry Byrd had
 Jaffe to Harry F. Byrd, 1 Jan. 1929, Byrd Papers; Byrd to Jaffe, 3 Jan. 1929, Louis I. Jaffe Papers,
 ViU.
 "Caldwell, "Presidential Election of 1928 in Virginia," p. 98; G. W. Lineweaver to John
 Garland Pollard, 14 Oct. 1928, Pollard Papers; Dabney interview.
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 emerged as the dominant figure in the Virginia Democratic organization,
 and he played the leading role in organizing the Smith campaign.
 Byrd's leadership in the Smith campaign had consolidated the governor's
 power in Virginia's Democratic organization. The process of choosing a
 Democratic nominee for the governorship in 1929 revealed that Byrd was
 clearly in control. After Smith's defeat, Byrd wrote confidentially to Glass
 that "a great deal depends on the result of the next gubernatorial election.
 It is important that Cannon, Hepburn and Peters do not dictate our nomi-
 nee." He added that there was "some talk" in Richmond about Sen.
 G. Walter Mapp as the possible Democratic nominee. Governor Byrd ob-
 jected to Mapp because "no man has accepted dictation from Cannon to a
 greater extent than Mapp during his term in the State Senate."57
 Harry Byrd had not groomed a successor. The Democrats' poor perform-
 ance in the Democratic counties of Tidewater in 1928 convinced him that
 the 1929 nominee should be an eastern Virginian and a dry, but also
 someone without close ties to either the organization or the Anti-Saloon
 League. The man who met these specifications was John Garland Pollard.
 The former attorney general had been outspoken in his support of Byrd's
 gubernatorial program, and he had demonstrated his party loyalty in his
 speeches for Al Smith. Byrd sent his political confidant E. R. ("Ebbie")
 Combs to ask Pollard if he would run for governor with the support of
 the organization. After considering the matter a few days, Pollard met with
 Byrd and accepted the organization's offer of support.58
 Byrd's choice of Pollard as his successor did not please every member of
 the Democratic hierarchy. Sen. Claude Swanson and Congressman Patrick
 Henry Drewry of the Fourth District believed that Senator Mapp could
 unify the Democrats and attract the anti-Smith faction back to the party.
 Byrd decided that he would have to confront Swanson with the decision
 that Pollard would receive the organization's support for governor. Byrd,
 accompanied by several political confidants, drove to Washington and in-
 formed the senator of Pollard's selection. There is no record of Swanson's
 response, but Byrd's action indicated that he had indeed consolidated his
 control over the Virginia Democratic party.59
 57 Harry F. Byrd to Carter Glass, 26 Nov. 1928, Glass Papers. Reverend Peters was another
 ally of Cannon in the Virginia Anti-Saloon League. He served as state prohibition commissioner
 from 1916 to 1920.
 68 Hopewell, "An Outsider Looking In," pp. 148, 152-54. Senator Glass had informed Pollard
 shortly after the presidential election that "if we are to have an Eastern man I should infinitely
 prefer you" for the gubernatorial nomination (Carter Glass to John Garland Pollard, 21 Nov.
 1928, Glass Papers).
 89 Hopewell, "An Outsider Looking In," pp. 154-55.
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 With an eye to the 1929 primary, Governor Byrd expressed the wish
 that "the rank and file should be permitted to return to the Party." Vir-
 ginia's election laws stipulated that those who had voted against a party
 in the election immediately preceding could not participate in that party's
 next primary. Requested by the Democratic state executive committee for
 his legal opinion, Attorney General John R. Saunders, an organization
 stalwart, advised that the bolting Democrats of 1928 could legally vote in
 the 1929 primary. He claimed a voter's action in choosing presidential
 electors, since they were not nominees of the Virginia Democratic party, did
 not determine his political affiliation for a state primary.60
 Saunders's interpretation made it possible for the anti-Smith Democrats
 to rejoin their party as if nothing had happened; however, his ruling had
 serious implications for the future of the Virginia Democratic party. Po-
 litical scientist Larry Sabato has written that "this separation of the state
 party from its national counterpart and the concurrent de-emphasis on
 loyalty to the national party was in large measure responsible for the stability
 and equilibrium which the Organization achieved and maintained over sev-
 eral decades." The separation of the state and national parties enabled
 conservative adherents of the Byrd organization to vote for Republicans in
 national elections while maintaining their party regularity in Virginia.
 Whether aware of this implication or not, Governor Byrd and the other
 organization leaders welcomed their strayed brethren of 1928 back to the
 Democratic party.61
 Despite his success in 1928, Bishop Cannon never again played a role in
 Democratic party affairs in Virginia. His apostasy from the party became
 complete in 1929. On 31 May Cannon called on the anti-Smith Democrats
 to stay out of the primary and urged them to nominate a gubernatorial
 candidate who had actively opposed Smith in 1928. The anti-Smith Demo-
 crats and the Republicans renewed their coalition when each group nomi-
 nated William Moseley Brown for governor. Cannon welcomed this re-
 newed alliance. Brown and his supporters hammered away at the issues of
 1928?Al Smith, John J. Raskob, and prohibition?but found the voters
 unresponsive. Even when Brown began to concentrate on state issues late
 ?o Harry F. Byrd to Carter Glass, 18 Nov. 1928, Glass Papers; Alvin L. Hall, "Virginia Back
 in the Fold: The Gubernatorial Campaign and Election of 1929," VMHB, LXXIII (1965), 282;
 Larry Sabato, The Democratic Party Primary in Virginia: Tantamount to Election No Longer
 (Charlottesville, 1977), pp. 40-41; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face
 of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966 (Charlottesville, 1968), pp. 217-18. Saunders's ruling seemed
 highly questionable in view of the statement in the party plan that the Virginia Democratic state
 convention "shall nominate as many Presidential electors as the state of Virginia is entitled to."
 61 Sabato, Democratic Party Primary, p. 43.
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 in the campaign, his tactics had little effect. Pollard was elected by 70,000
 votes. The electorate had given a vote of confidence to the Democratic
 organization headed by Harry F. Byrd and to the governor's program of
 reform. No longer concerned with the issues of 1928, the voters had
 repudiated Bishop Cannon, whose political standing had fallen significantly
 even before the election.62
 During the summer of 1929 Bishop Cannon's personal reputation and
 political influence were seriously undermined by a series of revelations in the
 press. In June two New York newspapers disclosed that Bishop Cannon
 had been a leading customer of a shady brokerage firm for two years. After
 the allegations of Cannon's stock market gambling had a chance to sink
 in with the Virginia electorate, Senator Glass provided evidence that the
 bishop had hoarded flour during World War I. In late July Glass's news-
 paper, the Lynchburg News, charged that Cannon had misappropriated
 Methodist church funds for the Virginia anti-Smith Democrats in 1928.
 The discredited Cannon announced his withdrawal from the Virginia cam-
 paign and sailed to Brazil on 11 October. The anti-Smith campaign had been
 severely wounded by his disgrace.63
 Governor Byrd's refusal to conciliate Bishop Cannon in 1929 and Senator
 Glass's efforts to discredit him suggest another conclusion about the 1928
 campaign in Virginia. A significant motive prompting the leaders' exer-
 tions for Al Smith was party loyalty. Recalling Bishop Cannon's dominant
 role in Virginia politics before World War I, they were determined to keep
 Cannon and his allies from playing a leadership role again in Democratic
 party affairs. Neither the state nor the party would benefit from a take-
 over by Cannon. Party loyalty, however, was not an easy course for the
 Democratic leaders in 1928. They were warned of possible retribution at
 the ballot box by anti-Smith Democrats. Harry Byrd, nevertheless, de-
 clared that "party government cannot exist unless the minority will be
 ?? Dabney, Dry Messiah, pp. 192-95; Patterson, 'Tall of a Bishop/' JSH, ????? (1973),
 500-502; Hall, "Virginia Back in the Fold," VMHB, LXX1II (1965), 282, 286-91, 296-99, 301;
 Hopewell, "An Outsider Looking In," pp. 155, 162, 191. Brown was a professor of psychology
 at Washington and Lee University. The executive leadership of the anti-Smith faction, the Com-
 mittee of Ten, negotiated secredy with Virginia Republican leader Henry W. Anderson. Their
 agreement provided that the two groups would continue their cooperation during the 1929 cam-
 paign. Anderson chose Brown, who had made several notable anti-Smith speeches in 1928, as the
 coalition candidate (Hopewell, "An Outsider Looking In," pp. 172-73).
 *3 Patterson, "Fall of a Bishop," JSH, XXXIX (1973), 499-508, 513-18; Hall, "Virginia Back
 in the Fold," VMHB, LXXIII (1965), 290-91; Hopewell, "An Outsider Looking In," pp. 181,
 184, 187. The brokerage firm, Kable and Company, had declared bankruptcy, and Glass had
 encouraged Democratic party officials in New York to pursue rumors that Bishop Cannon had
 been involved with the firm.
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 loyal to the nominees selected by the majority." Byrd's concept of party
 loyalty in 1928 seems ironic in the light of the "golden silence" which he
 maintained in presidential elections after the Democratic party moved to
 the left under Franklin D. Roosevelt. When he was reminded of his efforts
 for Al Smith during the Harry Truman campaign of 1948, Byrd wrote
 that "the Democrats of Virginia could make an honorable fight for Smith,
 because we believed in most of the things for which he stood. The same
 situation does not exist today." Time and changed circumstances had
 affected Byrd's concept of party loyalty. Another purpose, more elevated
 than party loyalty, had also prompted the Democratic leaders in 1928.64
 Their most idealistic motive in campaigning for Smith was the defense of
 religious liberty. The correspondence and speeches of Byrd, Glass, and
 Pollard reveal their genuine commitment to the constitutional principle
 that there should be no religious test for holding public office. Glass referred
 to the campaign against Smith on religious grounds as "un-American and
 un-christian and... greatly to be deplored." To Louis I. Jaffe the result of
 the election was "a mere incident of politics." The important fact was that
 Governor Byrd, and the same might be said of the other Democratic leaders,
 had "the courage and magnanimity to champion the cause of intellectual
 and religious liberty in a campaign in which such a course invited the most
 serious reprisals from politically powerful reactionaries." This defense of
 basic principles was "something to treasure as in keeping with the finest
 Virginia traditions and the best American traditions as well." Harry Byrd
 had no regrets. "If the same situation should again be presented to me,"
 he wrote in January 1929, "I would not change one iota my attitude except
 perhaps to increase my efforts in behalf of the Democratic party and the
 preservation of the fundamental principles on which our government was
 founded."65
 84 Text of statement by Harry F. Byrd, 23 Aug. 1928, Byrd Papers; Richmond Times-Dispatch,
 24 Aug. 1928; Harry F. Byrd to E. R. Combs, 19 July 1948, Byrd Papers. Two examples of
 threats of retaliation at the ballot box by anti-Smith Democrats are Louis F. Powell to John
 Garland Pollard, 21 Sept. 1928, Pollard Papers; and W. P. Richardson to Carter Glass, 10 Nov.
 1928, Glass Papers.
 65 Carter Glass to Walter T. Bazaar, 10 Nov. 1928, Glass Papers; Louis I. Jaffe to Harry F.
 Byrd, 1 Jan. 1929, Byrd Papers; Byrd to Jaffe, 3 Jan. 1929, Jaffe Papers.
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